Prophet Muhammad: The First Arab Zionist
Reminding Muslims that the Quran recognizes the Jewish claim to the land of Israel is useless. For centuries, they have read the Quran through the interpretation of the Caliphates of Damascus and Baghdad—the same governing systems that only accepted Islam on the condition that it expanded their power, and otherwise held no respect for it.
For the modern Muslim, the Quran has no value unless it justifies Arab fascism. Otherwise, Zionism would be natural to them. Especially because Muhammad himself was the first Arab Zionist: Not only did he recognize the Jewish claim to the land, but he went so far as to change the original qibla (direction of prayer), which was toward Jerusalem, to Mecca.
The Caliphate interpreted this change of qibla as the beginning of conflict with the Jews. But in reality, it was the first sign of compromise, because there was nothing preventing Muhammad from keeping the original qibla. Despite the established hadiths and narratives, Muhammad’s conflict with the Jews of Hijaz was political, not ideological. His ideological disputes were with Christians, which later led to the famous incident of mubahala (mutual invocation of curses).
It’s almost impossible to uncover what exact historical events shaped the worldview of the Muslims of that time. But if we use the Quran as the standard, the difference between the worldview of today’s Muslims and the Quran’s is evident. When the Quran recounts the story of Bani Israel (the Children of Israel), its purpose is to tell Muslims that the same events that happened to the Jews will also happen to them. When it points out the mistakes of the Israelites, it is warning Muslims that they too will make the same mistakes, although in different contexts. But the Caliphate-oriented Muslim worldview interprets it like this: “God created the Jews as a means to test Muslims, to see which Muslim can turn the harm inflicted by the Jews back onto them!”
The entire idea of building a mosque on a site that had been a Jewish temple for centuries—initiated by the Umayyad Caliph—was based on this worldview that the Muslim is the center of existence, with all other creations revolving around him (just as he circles the Kaaba). Just as creatures in orbit —like bees and snakes—are divided into beneficial and harmful ones, humans are divided into those who benefit or harm the Muslim. And Jews belong to the harmful category. Based on this, Allah’s entire plan is to test Muslims on whether they can overcome harmful creatures like Jews and reward those who succeed by granting them entry to paradise. The majority of those identified as Muslims worldwide—especially those connected to the Middle East—share this worldview. It doesn’t matter how they express it or how they try to hide it. Therefore, referring back to the Quran to prove that their actions contradict their own religion is entirely pointless. The average Muslim has no belief in a Quran that doesn’t place the Muslim at the center of existence and at the pinnacle of global power.
In a video from Gaza, a man who seems distressed by the conditions of war shouts, “We don’t want Quds (Jerusalem)—just stop the war! Every day, we’re collecting corpses.” Even in the words of someone who dares to stand out among the Palestinians by calling for compromise, there is no mention of forming a Palestinian state, achieving political independence, or defining borders. In a typical war scenario, when one side can no longer continue the fight, the concession they offer as a compromise is usually political or strategic. Yet even among the rare few Gazans who dare to speak of compromise, the concession they are willing to offer is ownership of Jerusalem—a concession that has no impact on their quality of life or the future of their children.
Western academic creatures persist in reducing this war to issues of land or colonialism. But to the average Palestinian, even speaking of relinquishing Jerusalem feels like blasphemy. And his people sympathize with him only because they assume that in extreme circumstances, one might utter words of blasphemy, and Allah will likely forgive him. But if the hardship is alleviated and there is a chance for ceasefire or a solution, there would no longer be any excuse for such blasphemy. This is why anytime there has been a possibility of achieving a two-state solution with them achieving all they wanted except Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem, the Palestinian side rejected it. They see ownership of Jerusalem as the only valid goal. Because they believe Allah’s power is reflected through Muslim power, and Muslim power is achieved through dominance over harmful creatures like Jews.
This framing of the Muslim worldview and this war is something you will never hear in Western universities. Because your Western professors have only studied the Middle East—they haven’t lived it. – Afshin Azad and Yusof RuyanFar
The Middle East Doesn’t Bleed Red, or Blue
No matter how many American Muslims or Jews voted for Trump or Harris due to Middle Eastern events, both minorities share a belief: that they can reshape the region. Presidents of a superpower can influence the Middle East, but they cannot fundamentally change it—nor can their voters. This isn’t because American Muslims or Jews are too far removed from the Middle East. Or because the average American voter isn’t the most powerful citizen in the world—they are. It is because the Middle East changes incredibly slowly and remains indifferent to external noise.
One common mistake made by those outside the Middle East is consuming too much news about it. This region produces more news than anywhere else, yet it is the least responsive to its own headlines. One day one of the largest refugee displacements in history takes place here. he next day, all attention shifts to a pop singer reciting the Quran in a way deemed offensive. One day, streets are blocked in outrage over the bombing of a hospital, with protests so intense it seems at least three governments in the region might collapse by the next morning. The next day, the same protest site hosts a local farmer’s market, as if nothing ever happened.
Since news about the Middle East always carries traces of foreign governments’ involvement, overconsumption of such news creates the illusion that external powers are the main orchestrators of events here. Superficially, this appears true. In Lebanon, for example, people wait for foreign officials to visit and tell them what to do. But this is just the surface. Beneath this thin layer, the ancient currents of the Middle East continue their slow, magmatic flow.
Yes, a Republican U.S. administration might impose Condition X on Lebanon, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, while a Democratic administration might impose Condition Y. And Condition X might lead to one series of events, while Condition Y might lead to another. But both conditions fall within the deeper undercurrent of the Middle East.
Here’s an example: Republicans have generally been friendlier to the Saudi royal family, but the Democrats not as much. Yet, after over half a century of these back-and-forth warm and cold relationships with Saudi Arabia, the average Saudi citizen hasn’t become more liberal. The only real change in Saudi society over the past fifty years has been that hatred for Iran has overtaken hatred for Jews. Some mistakenly interpret this as Saudi society becoming more accepting of Israel. In reality, there hasn’t been any acceptance at all. What has happened is simply a shift, where one hatred has replaced another. This is exactly part of the Middle East’s deeper undercurrent. The composition of hatreds, and their shifts from the background to the forefront, is what shapes the region’s course.
When blamed for their choices on election day, Muslim and Jewish minorities in America defend themselves by saying, “We weren’t numerous enough to swing an election.” But as far as the Middle East is concerned, even if 80% of eligible voters in America were Muslim or Jewish, nothing would change substantially. Gaza wouldn’t become Singapore, and Saudis wouldn’t suddenly start caring about democracy. – Afshin Azad and Yusof RuyanFar
On Russia
1- The difference between Russia and China, though they pretend to be allies against the U.S., is that Russia wants a world without rules. When they say “new world order,” they really mean “world of no order.” In this anarcho-villainy system, the Russians can survive and expand their power. This system is already implemented domestically, where even oligarchs have no security. There are no fixed rules. Everyone must adapt to the ruler, whose decisions might shift at any time. That’s why Shoigu is alive, while Wagner’s leader is dead. Even though Wagner was a force of chaos, it still needed some rules to operate—rules Russia doesn’t provide. China, on the other hand, doesn’t want a world without rules. It wants to change the rules into a system that gives more power to governments. China doesn’t seek a dystopia but supports a rule-based order where individuals have far less power than they do in the American system. China’s issue isn’t with the U.S. government—it’s with the American worldview.
2- Because anarcho-villainy dominates Russia internally and is now being exported beyond its borders, predicting power dynamics becomes impossible.
3- Where it’s unclear who will gain power or where it will land, those most likely to succeed are the most ruthless or those deeply tied to the corruption and violence necessary for survival. Within Russia, radical Muslim extremists are stronger players in this field than anyone else. Even stronger than Russia’s loud nationalist bullies.
4- Russia’s territorial ambitions mirror Nazi Germany’s. Both are fueled by frustration over losing their global status, a desire for revenge, and a need to compensate for those losses. The difference is that post-war Germany was able to rebuild itself due to its rich cultural and intellectual foundation. Russian society lacks this capacity. It cannot escape the swamp it has created for itself. Regardless of who is in power, you can expect all sorts of destructive actions to come out of this society. – Afshin Azad